Hackers as terrorists? Why it doesn't compute by Conway, Maura
 1 
‘Hackers as Terrorists? Why it Doesn’t Compute.’ Computer Fraud and Security 2003 (12) 
(December): 10-13. 
 
 
 
Hackers as Terrorists? Why it Doesn’t Compute 
 
 
Maura Conway 
 
School of International Relations 
University of St. Andrews 
St Andrews KY16 9AL  
Scotland  
 
Tel.: +44 (0)1334 462939 
 mc52@st-andrews.ac.uk  
 
 
Abstract: The bulk of this article is concerned with showing why computer hackers 
and terrorists are unlikely to form an unholy alliance to engage in so-called 
cyberterrorism. The remainder of the paper examines why neither hacktivists nor 
crackers fall easily into the cyberterrorist category either. 
 
Key Words: Cyberterrorism, Hacking, Hacktivism, Cracking 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
 
‘Hacking’ is the term used to describe unauthorised access to or use of a computer 
system. The term ‘hacktivism’ is composed of the words ‘hacking’ and ‘activism’ and 
is the handle used to describe politically motivated hacking. ‘Cracking’ refers to 
hacking with a criminal intent; the term is composed of the words ‘criminal’ and 
‘hacking.’ In a majority of both academic analyses and media reports of 
cyberterrorism, one or other of these terms – hacking, hacktivism, cracking - or the 
activities associated with them are equated with or identified as variants of 
cyberterrorism.  
 
 
The bulk of this article is concerned with showing why computer hackers and 
terrorists are unlikely to form an unholy alliance to engage in so-called 
cyberterrorism. The remainder of the paper examines why neither hacktivists nor 
crackers fall easily into the cyberterrorist category either. 
 
 
Hackers as Terrorists? 
 
Much has been made of the similarities between profiles of terrorists and those of 
hackers. Both groups tend to be composed primarily of young, disaffected, males. In 
the case of computer hackers, a distinct psychological discourse branding them the 
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product of a pathological addiction to computers has emerged. In fact, a large number 
of hackers who have been tried before the criminal courts for their exploits have 
successfully used mental disturbance as a mitigating factor in their defence, and have 
received probation with counselling instead of jail time as a result. These young men 
have allowed themselves to be portrayed as personal and social failures: computer-
dependent individuals, vulnerable to the personal and professional frustrations that 
have been found to underlie anti-social behaviour.  
 
Hackers are commonly depicted as socially isolated and lacking in communication 
skills. Their alleged anger at authority is said to reduce the likelihood of their dealing 
with these frustrations directly and constructively. In addition, the flexibility of their 
ethical systems; lack of loyalty to individuals, institutions, and countries; and lack of 
empathy for others are said to reduce inhibitions against potentially damaging acts. At 
the same time, their description as lonely, socially naïve, and egotistical appears to 
make them vulnerable to manipulation and exploitation. 
 
 
Hackers For Hire 
 
Recently, the possibility of terrorist groups employing the services of hackers to carry 
out attacks has received growing attention.  
 
Some hackers have demonstrated a willingness to sell their skills to outsiders. The 
most famous example is the Hanover Hackers case. In 1986, a group of hackers in 
Hanover, Germany, began selling information they obtained through unlawfully 
accessing the computer systems of various Departments of Energy and Defence, a 
number of defence contractors, and the US Space Agency NASA, to the Soviet KGB. 
Their activities were discovered in 1988; two years later the group were finally 
identified and apprehended.1 In the early 1990s, a group of Dutch hackers succeeded 
in accessing US Army, Navy, and Air Force systems. They sought to sell their skills 
and sensitive information they had obtained via the intrusions to Iraq, but were 
apprehended by police in the Netherlands.  
 
A majority of the analyses of hackers-for-hire stress the ease and advantages of such 
outsourcing. These analysts presume that terrorist groups will be able to easily contact 
hackers-for-hire, while keeping their direct involvement hidden through the use of 
cut-outs and proxies. The hackers could then be employed to reconnoitre enemy 
information systems to identify targets and methods of access. Furthermore, it is 
posited that if hacker groups could be employed to actually commit acts of 
cyberterrorism, terrorist groups would improve their ability to avoid culpability or 
blame altogether.  
 
 
The Drawbacks 
 
There are important risks and disadvantages to such schemes, however. First, seeking 
to employ hackers to commit acts not just of disruption, but of significant destruction 
that may involve killing people would in all likelihood prove considerably more 
difficult than buying information for the purposes of intelligence gathering. Second, 
simply contacting, never mind employing, would-be hackers-for-hire would subject 
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terrorists to significant operational security risks. It is notoriously difficult to confirm 
with any certainty with whom one is in contact in a purely virtual relationship. Third, 
terrorist organisations run the risk of cyber-surrogates being turned into double agents 
by hostile governments or shadowy others. There is a strong case to be made for such 
hackers changing sides. This is because the primary motive of the hacker-for-hire is 
financial gain thus, given sufficient monetary inducement, such individuals are 
unlikely to object to reporting to other than their original ‘employer.’   
 
David Tucker of the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California also has 
some interesting insights into the hacker-for-hire scenario. Based on a simulation in 
which he took part, which involved a hacker and members of a number of terrorist 
organisations, Tucker foresees potential organisational problems for any hacker-
terrorist collaboration. He points out that on those occasions when hackers aren’t 
acting alone, they operate in flat, open-ended associations. This is the opposite of 
many terrorist groups, which are closed hierarchical organisations. There is certainly 
the potential for clashes between these different organisational styles, developed in 
different operating environments, and derived from different psychological needs.  
 
Tucker reports that a former member of ETA (Basque Homeland and Liberty) who 
was involved in the simulation repeatedly stressed the need to belong and the strength 
of attachment to the group as characteristic of members of clandestine organisations. 
This is not a character trait typically associated with hackers. In fact, in the simulation 
in which Tucker took part, the hacker and the terrorists involved disagreed over 
tactics and had difficulty communicating. Eventually, these difficulties became so 
great that it resulted in a breakdown in the simulation group. The hacker and the 
terrorists were simply not able to work together. Tucker observes that if the 
breakdown can be generalised, it would have obvious consequences for hacker-
terrorist collaboration.2 
 
Another risk faced by terrorists planning to employ IT to carry out attacks arises when 
the terrorists themselves lack sufficient computer expertise: there is the likelihood that 
they would recruit hackers who would prove insufficiently skilled to carry out the 
planned attacks.  
 
 
Open Source Intelligence 
 
O’Brien and Nusbaum make an interesting point when they assert that: 
 
As IT capabilities continue to proliferate, merging advances in computing 
with telecommunications and related technologies, both the amount of 
information and the types of information readily available from open 
sources are greater than ever before. It is, therefore, ironic that, although 
there has been a great deal of theorising regarding the potential for 
terrorist groups to use [Information Warfare], there has been little open-
source research on this subject. Open source intelligence (OSINT) is 
definitely a key asset for monitoring potential threats by cyberterrorists, 
especially as information concerning Western IT programmes, weaknesses 
and vulnerabilities can easily be drawn from open sources.3  
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O’Brien and Nusbaum suggest that intelligence agencies should utilise online chat 
forums, hacker Web sites, etc. to gather intelligence on contemporary asymmetric 
threats.  They suggest that most hackers possess a large degree of hubris with regards 
to their hacking knowledge and abilities as a result of which such “threat-savvy users” 
could be coaxed into revealing vulnerabilities they had discovered on the Net, as well 
as boasting about their own abilities and exploits. This position is endorsed by Soo 
Hoo, Goodman, and Greenberg: 
 
Foreign Bases of operation might be useful for intelligence-gathering 
activities, but again, they are not required for IT-enabled 
terrorism…[I]nformation about various systems’ vulnerabilities is often 
shared online between hackers on computer bulletin boards, Web sites, 
news groups and other forms of electronic association, and this 
information can be obtained without setting foot in the target country.4  
 
 
Cybermercenaries 
 
It seems unlikely, however, that professional hackers or cyber mercenaries would 
engage in the cavalier behaviour described above: 
 
While amateur hackers receive most publicity, the real threat are the 
professionals or ‘cyber mercenaries.’ This term refers to highly skilled and 
trained products of government agencies or corporate intelligence 
branches that work on the open market. 
The Colombian drug cartels hired cyber mercenaries to install and 
run a sophisticated secure communications system; Amsterdam-based 
gangs used professional hackers to monitor and disrupt the 
communications and information systems of police surveillance teams.5  
 
There is no evidence of such mercenaries having carried out attacks under the 
auspices of known terrorist organisations, however.   
 
 
Alternatives? 
 
The only likely scenario, given the above, is cyber attacks carried out by terrorists 
with hacking skills. This is not impossible. The current trend towards easier-to-use 
hacking tools indicates that this hurdle will not be as high in the future as it is today, 
even as it is significantly lower today than it was even two or three years ago. 
According to William Church, a former US Army Intelligence Officer, the IRA (Irish 
Republican Army) were on the verge of carrying out such attacks, prior to the 
Northern Ireland peace process.  
 
They had computer-oriented cells. They could have done it. They were 
already attacking the infrastructure by placing real or phoney bombs in 
electric plants, to see if they could turn off the lights in London. But they 
were still liking the feel of physical weapons, and trusting them.6 
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This is unsurprising: terrorists are generally conservative in the adoption of new tools 
and tactics. Factors influencing the adoption of some new tool or technology include 
the terrorist group’s knowledge and understanding of the tool, and their trust in it. 
Terrorists generally only put their trust in those tools that they have designed and built 
themselves, have experimented with, and thus know from experience will work. It’s 
for this reason that weapons and tools generally proliferate from states to terrorists. 
 
So much for hackers as cyberterrorists, but what of hacktivists? 
  
 
Hacktivism versus Cyberterrorism 
 
Hacktivism grew out of hacker culture, although there was little evidence of sustained 
political engagement by hackers prior to the mid-1990s. Nineteen ninety-eight is 
viewed by many as the year in which hacktivism really took off. It was in ’98 that the 
US-based Electronic Disturbance Theatre (EDT) first employed it’s FloodNet 
software in an effort to crash various Mexican government Web sites to protest the 
treatment of indigenous peoples in Chiapas and support the actions of the Zapatista 
rebels. Over 8,000 people participated in this, one of the first digital sit-ins. It was 
also in ’98 that JF, a young British hacker, entered about 300 Web sites and replaced 
their home pages with anti-nuclear text and imagery. At that time, JF’s hack was the 
biggest political hack of its kind. ‘Hacktions’ also took place in Australia, China, 
India, Portugal, Sweden, and elsewhere in the same year.7 Michael Vatis, one-time 
Director of the FBI’s National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC), has labelled 
such acts as cyberterrorism.  
 
 
MVDA versus IVDA 
 
Tim Jordan identifies two different types of hacktivism: Mass Virtual Direct Action 
(MVDA) and Individual Virtual Direct Action (IVDA). According to Jordan 
 
“Mass Virtual Direct Action involves the simultaneous use, by many 
people, of the Internet to create electronic civil disobedience. It is named 
partly in homage to the dominant form of offline protest during the 1990s, 
non-violent direct action or NVDA.8  
 
The FloodNet attack on the Mexican government Web sites described above was an 
example of MVDA as was the action against the 1999 World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) conference in Seattle. The organisers of the latter event, the UK-based 
Electrohippies, estimated that over 450,000 people participated in their sit-in on the 
WTO Web site. In contrast to MVDA, IVDA utilises classical hacker/cracker 
techniques and actions for attacking computer systems, but employs them for 
explicitly political purposes. Jordan makes the point that the name IVDA does not 
mean the actions are necessarily undertaken by those acting alone, but instead that the 
nature of such actions means that they must be taken by individuals (i.e. they in no 
way rely on mass action), although they may be taken by many individuals acting in 
concert.9  JF’s anti-nuclear protest described above was an example of IVDA, which 
generally consists of infiltration of targeted networks and semiotic attacks (i.e. Web 
site defacements).  
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The major difference between MVDA and IVDA, apart from those already described, 
is that MVDA activists rarely seek to hide their identities – through the use of 
pseudonyms (handles), for example – or cover their tracks. Advocates of MVDA seek 
to gather together large groups of people to take part in hacktions and thus to inspire 
public debate and discussion, and maintain that they have a right to protest even if 
some of those protests are illegal or bordering on same. Many of those using IVDA, 
on the other hand, act alone and prefer to remain anonymous, which raises issues of 
representativeness, authenticity, etc. Finally, there are also differences between those 
hacktivists who are devoted to the classical hacking ideal of free flow of information 
and therefore view DoS attacks as wrong in principle and those who view MVDA as 
both direct non-violent action and important symbolic protest.10 
Direct Action Net Politics 
 
It is the disruptive nature of hacktions that distinguishes this form of ‘direct action Net 
politics’ or ‘electronic civil disobedience’ from other forms of online political 
activism. E-mail petitions, political Web sites, discussion lists, and a vast array of 
other electronic tools have been widely adopted as recruitment, organising, lobbying, 
and communicating techniques by social movements and political organisations of all 
sorts. This type of use of the Internet by political activists has been characterised as 
‘Computerised Activism.’ The hacktivist movement is different, because it does not 
view the Internet simply as a channel for communication, but also crucially as a site 
for action. It is a movement united by its common method as opposed to its common 
purpose. Those political causes that have attracted hacktivist activity range from 
campaigns against globalisation, restrictions on encryption technology, and political 
repression in Latin America to abortion, the spread of electronic surveillance 
techniques and environmental protection. Hacktivists are, therefore, arrayed across a 
far wider political spectrum than the techno-libertarian agenda with which committed 
‘netizens,’ including the hacker fraternity, are often identified.  
 
 
Cyber Crime versus Cyberterrorism 
 
The issue of computer crime was first raised in the 1960s, when it was realised that 
computers could easily be employed to commit a variety of frauds. Cyber crime is a 
more recent phenomenon, which was enabled with the introduction of the modem and 
the ability to remotely access computer systems, the explosion of e-commerce, and 
the resultant increase in financial transactions taking place via the Internet. Attempts 
to conflate cyberterrorism and cyber crime were inevitable. A UN manual on IT-
related crime recognises that, even after several years of debate among experts on just 
what constitutes cyber crime and what cyberterrorism, "there is no internationally 
recognised definition of those terms."11 Nevertheless, it is clear that while 
cyberterrorism and cyber crime both employ information technology, their motives 
and goals do not coincide. Cyber criminals have financial gain as their primary 
motive. Areas in which individual criminals and criminal organisations have proven 
proficient in cyberspace include: the theft of electronic funds, the theft of credit card 
information, extortion, and fraud. 
 
Secondary to financial gain is the acquisition of information that can underpin the 
operations associated with making money. It is for this reason that transnational crime 
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syndicates are probably more interested in maintaining a functioning Internet than 
attacking Internet infrastructures. In other words, organised crime groups view the 
Net as a tool, not a target. This is because many such organisations employ the 
Internet – and the public telecommunications network generally – as a vehicle for 
intelligence gathering, fraud, extortion, and theft. For example, as banks and other 
financial institutions increasingly rely on the Internet for their daily operations, they 
become more attractive targets for criminal activity. Having said that, criminal 
groups, such as drug traffickers, may seek to penetrate information systems to disrupt 
law enforcement operations or collect information on operations planned against 
them.  
 
 
Conclusion  
 
Although the proceeds of cyber crime may be used to support terrorism, such 
activities ought not to be classed as cyberterrorism per se. Cracking is not 
cyberterrorism.  
 
Hacktivists, although they use the Internet as a site for political action, are not 
cyberterrorists either. They view themselves as heirs to those who employ the tactics 
of trespass and blockade in the realm of real-world protest.  They are, for the most 
part, engaged in disruption not destruction. According to Carmin Karasic, the 
software engineer who designed the FloodNet program: “This isn’t cyberterrorism. 
It’s more like conceptual art.”12  
 
The US Department of Justice labelled Kevin Mitnick, probably the world’s most 
famous computer hacker, a “computer terrorist.” On his arraignment, Mitnick was 
denied access not only to computers, but also to a phone, because the judge believed 
that, with a phone and a whistle, Mitnick could set off a nuclear attack. Incredulity 
aside, hackers are unlikely to become terrorists, because their motives are divergent. 
Despite the allegedly similar personality traits shared by both terrorists and present-
day hackers, the fact remains that terrorism is an extreme and violent occupation, and 
far more aberrant than prankish hacking. Although hackers have demonstrated that 
they are willing to crash computer networks to cause functional paralysis and even 
significant financial loss, this propensity for expensive mischief is not sufficient 
evidence that they would be willing to jeopardise lives or even kill for a political 
cause.  
 
 
References 
 
1 For more, see Clifford Stoll’s The Cuckoo’s Egg. London: Pan Books (1991). 
2 The Future of Armed Resistance: Cyberterror? Mass Destruction? (Conference 
Report). The Center on Terrorism and Irregular Warfare (2000).  
3 Jane’s Intelligence Review 15(11): 53. 
4 Survival 39(3): 143.  
5 Jane’s Intelligence Review 15(10): 53. 
6 Analyzing the Threat of Cyberterrorism TechWeb: The Business Technology 
Network 25 September 1998.  
7 See “Hacktivists” of All Persuasions Take Their Struggle to the  
 8 
Web The New York Times 31 October 1998; The Golden Age of Hacktivism Wired 22 
September 1998. 
8 Computer Fraud & Security  2001(4): 8. 
9 Computer Fraud & Security  2001(4): 9. 
10 Computer Fraud & Security  2001(4): 11. 
11 Michael Mates Technology and Terrorism. Brussels: NATO (2001).  
12  
“Hacktivists” of All Persuasions Take Their Struggle to the  
Web The New York Times 31 October 1998. 
 
 
About the Author 
 
Maura Conway is a PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at Trinity 
College Dublin, Ireland, and a teaching fellow in the School of International Relations 
at the University of St. Andrews, Scotland. Her research interests are in the area of 
terrorism and the Internet. She has published in First Monday, Current History, the 
Journal of Information Warfare, and elsewhere. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
